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Abstrak: Telaah Kritis terhadap Filsafat Pendidikan Paulo Freire. Artikel ini 
membahas filsafat pendidikan Paulo Freire berbasiskan riset kepustakaan.  
Pembahasan dibagi ke dalam tiga bagian: (a) filsafat tentang manusia; (b) 
arkeologi kesadaran manusia; dan (c) politik pendidikan. Filsafat manusia 
Paulo  Freire dapat dikategorikan sebagai humanisme Marxis-Kristen, karena 
berbasiskan pada gagasan-gagasan yang berkembang dalam diskursus Marxis 
dan Kristen. Arkeologi kesadaran manusia yang dikonseptualisasi Freire 
merupakan sebuah studi tentang bentuk fundamental kesadaran manusia, dan 
bentuk-bentuk ini dapat dilihat melalui cara manusia memahami dan 
menerima realitas eksistensial yang melingkupinya, yaitu apakah mereka 
melihatnya secara magis, naif, atau kritis. Filsafat pendidikan Freire juga 
didasarkan pada asumsi bahwa pendidikan itu politik. Dengan bahasa lain, 
semua aktivitas pendidikan itu memiliki implikasi, kualitas, dan konsekuensi 
politis, karena semuanya berpengaruh terhadap subjektivitas manusia.  
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The bibliography of Paulo Freire 
has evolved over the last two decades 
in line with interest in reinventing his 
educational philosophy according to 
different contexts. The literature can 
be divided into several categories (Nur-
yatno, 2008:35-37); first, texts written 
by Freire himself; second, texts written 
by him in collaboration with others; 
third, texts written by scholars exclu-
sively discussing his life and thought; 
fourth, texts written to compare his 
thought with other scholars; and fifth, 
texts written to demonstrate the in-
fluence of Freire in certain social con-
texts, or in an attempt to apply his 
theory or methodology in different so-
cial contexts. 
Freire is “regarded as one of the 
most (if not the most) important li-
beration thinkers of the twentieth cen-
tury” (Peter Robert, 1999:35). His in-
fluence had been felt among the 
Maori’s (the indigenous people of 
New Zealand) communities since the 
1970s, when they started to become 
aware of their multiple oppressions 
and exploitation and began to quest-
ion deeply and profoundly the poli-
tics of domination. They felt that 
Freire not only gave them a language 
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to articulate their voices, but also pro-
vided ideas and strategies to proble-
matize their lives as a colonized peo-
ple in their own land.  However, the 
relationship between the Maori peo-
ple and Freire was not a linear one, in 
the sense that Freire’s writings pro-
vided a blueprint for liberation. In-
stead, they came to Freire only after 
having already conducted resistance 
and struggle. At this point, Freire’s 
writings strengthened their resolve 
and gave them direction, affirming 
and lending validity to their action.   
Freire’s association with popular 
education grew out of his activities in 
promoting critical literacy amongst 
peasants and workers in Brazil in the 
early 1960s. He had intention to make 
them literate and therefore eligible to 
vote. His pedagogical concept was not 
based on the conventional framework 
in which the emphasis is on enabling 
people to read texts. Freire’s literacy 
mission was broader than this: his 
aim was to relate the word to the 
world in order to make the process of 
learning produce political transfor-
mations (Freire and Macedo, 1987: 
45)—a subversive view perceived by 
the military regime as a danger to the 
status quo.   
Freire has also been connected 
with critical pedagogy, being number-
ed as one of three sources of this 
school besides Antonio Gramsci (with 
his concept of counter-hegemony) and 
the Frankfurt School’s critical theory 
(Patti Lather, 1998). These three sourc-
es provide the main thrust in the con-
tinuing development of critical peda-
gogy, such that even Paula Almann 
(1999:17) argues that any cultural act-
ion for transformation project must 
involve the ideas of Freire and Grams-
ci as its basic ingredients. It is not an 
exaggeration when Henry Giroux 
(1998:141) says that “I associate cri-
tical pedagogy with the work of Paulo 
Freire. And I think that anyone who 
took up the field, in some way, had to 
begin with him whether they liked 
him or not.” Thus, in any discussion 
of critical pedagogy it is almost im-
possible to ignore the legacy of Freire. 
 
KEY ISSUES OF FREIRE’S EDU-
CATIONAL PHILOSOPHY 
I will examine three key elements 
of Freire’s thought, namely philoso-
phy of human beings, archeology of 
consciousness, and the politics of edu-
cation. These elements are explored in 
the following pages. 
 
Philosophy of Human Beings 
Freire argues that no educational 
theory can be separated from the con-
cept of human beings. Freire’s philo-
sophy of human beings can be des-
cribed as Christian-Marxist human-
ism (John Elias, 1994). As a revolu-
tionary humanist, he demonstrates his 
profound love for humanity while his 
pedagogical theory is based on fun-
damental trust and faith in people. 
“To be a good educator, you need 
above all to have faith in human 
beings” (Freire, 1971, quoted in Ira 
Shor, 1993:25). 
Freire has a very optimistic view 
of human beings. He believes in the 
capacity of every human being to 
think, reflect, and name the world in 
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order to create history and culture, no 
matter how “ignorant” he or she may 
be. Freire unequivocally rejects the 
notion of a person as an empty vessel, 
arguing that every individual has 
valuable experiential knowledge and 
opinions through their relations with 
the world and other human beings. 
Humans have the capacity to look 
critically at their world through dia-
logical encounter with others. He in 
fact considered dialogue as an exis-
tential necessity. “Dialogue is the en-
counter of men, mediated by the 
world, in order to name the world” 
(Freire, 1971:76). 
Freire (1971) explains that hu-
mans, as incomplete beings, have an 
ontological and historical vocation to 
become more fully human. What he 
means by ‘ontological vocation’ is a 
human being’s innate duty to realize 
his/her full potential as a human. In 
the process of ‘becoming’, humans are 
called upon continually to humanize 
themselves through naming the world 
in action-reflection with other hu-
mans. By contrast, “dehumanization… 
is a distortion of the vocation of be-
coming more fully human” (Freire, 
1971:28). Dehumanization must not be 
perceived as a closed and static reali-
ty, but as a limiting situation that can 
be transformed. Since it is not a given 
destiny but socially constructed, it is 
the humanistic and historical task of 
every individual to challenge and 
transform it. Thus, humanization is 
not a gift but a duty that must be pur-
sued through struggle involving a 
double movement: increasing one’s 
consciousness capacity and changing 
the context of oppression—both of 
which are inter-connected dialectical-
ly. 
Human freedom is a precondition 
for achieving humanization. Freire be-
lieves in the capacity of the oppressed 
to become “new human beings,” who 
do not imitate their oppressor’s perso-
nality when they are liberated. Li-
beration thus aims to produce new 
human beings who have certain qua-
lifications, such as being just, lenient 
and democratic as opposed to autho-
ritarian and oppressive. 
Humans as subjects are rooted in 
historical struggle. In his discussion of 
Paulo Freire, Colin Lankshear (1993: 
95) says that for Freire humans “are 
‘beings of the praxis’ who live authen-
tically only when engaged in inquiry 
and creative transformation of the 
world.” Thus, humans are conscious 
of their historicity: as historical beings, 
they are aware of living in a particular 
time and location constituted by a 
multiplicity of life’s dimensions, such 
as gender, race, religion, politics, cul-
ture, and economics.   
Freire (1971:34) argues that the 
distinctive character of human beings 
is their capacity to think and engage 
in the historical world purposively. 
Reflective capacity enables humans to 
disassociate themselves from the world 
and give meaning to it. Thus, human 
beings can operate in the world 
through action and reflection for a 
purpose. They are capable not only of 
knowing the world, but also of ac-
tually knowing that they are knowing 
it. Humans are in and with the world 
through critical contact. Since humans 
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have the capacity to reflect, they are 
able to discover the contradictions in-
herent in reality and how to transform 
it. They are also able to “name the 
world” and transform it through their 
thought-language in order to create 
history and the future. 
John Elias (1994) criticizes Freire 
for his overly optimistic view on hu-
man beings, ignoring the fact that 
there are similarities and continuities 
that exist between humans and ani-
mals. Human actions are determined 
and influenced by external as well as 
unconscious factors. Nor is it not 
unusual to see humans behave like 
animals. Human nature has not only a 
bright side, but also a dark side. 
People can behave in either a good or 
an evil manner. The failure to take in-
to account the whole pictures of hu-
manity results in one-sided analysis 
and “neglects the possibilities that this 
critical reflection might be combined 
with self-interest to bring about a 
more oppressive situation that the 
previous system of domination” 
(Elias, 1994:84).  
Freire is also criticized for being 
overly optimistic in his views on li-
berated persons, as if such people will 
inevitably behave in a non-oppressive 
manner and act rationally, or as if 
when entrusted with power they will 
use it wisely without exploitation and 
oppression. The truth, however, often 
contradicts this view. “The oppressed 
once freed from oppression at times 
become the oppressors of others” 
(Elias, 1994:56). In other words, many 
liberated individuals when they gain 
power also use it to oppress others. 
For my own part I believe that Freire 
is not unaware of this fact. He tries to  
insure against this negative effect by 
warning the oppressed not to du-
plicate the oppressor’s mentality. In-
terestingly, Elias also affirms this view 
by saying that “What Freire rightfully 
stresses is that this [duplicating the 
oppressor’s mentality] does not nece-
ssarily have to happen” (Elias, 1994: 
56). Thus, Elias proposes a critique 
which he later (in the same para-
graph) contradicts.  
 
The Archaeology of Consciousness 
The theory of levels of conscious-
ness proposed by Freire is critical to 
understanding his thought. Freire de-
velops this theory in Education for 
Critical Consciousness, Pedagogy of the 
Oppressed and Cultural Action for Free-
dom. The archaeology of conscious-
ness involves study of the fundamen-
tal form of consciousness. Freire argu-
es that “consciousness is constituted 
in the dialectic of man’s objectification 
of and action upon the world” (1972: 
53). He agrees with Marx’s view that 
the social world contributes to shap-
ing the structure of one’s conscious-
ness and in turn one’s consciousness 
contributes to shaping the social world. 
The relationship between the socio-
economic and cultural context and 
one’s structure of consciousness is fun-
damentally dialectical. 
People’s consciousness of the world 
can be observed through the way they 
perceive their existential reality, i.e., 
whether they see it naively, supersti-
tiously, or critically. The fundamental 
question is: Do people distinguish 
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that which is natural (what is given) 
from that which is cultural, i.e., so-
cially constructed? Freire (1985:106) 
says that “one of the important points 
in conscientization is to provoke re-
cognition of the world, not as a “given” 
world, but as a world dynamically “in 
the making.” The ability or inability to 
distinguish between the two domains 
determines the stages of conscious-
ness, whether magical, naïve, or cri-
tical.  
The main characteristic of semi-
intransitive or magical consciousness 
is an uncritical or unreflective accep-
tance of the world. It is called semi-
intransitive because the individual 
who possesses it is in no sense a sub-
ject who knows objects or things in 
the world. People with this type of 
consciousness view their life condit-
ions as inevitable, given, natural, and 
impervious to change. This fatalistic 
view is caused by the inability to dis-
associate from the world. They have a 
magical attitude that tends to asso-
ciate life with destiny and attribute 
historical circumstances to superior 
powers, i.e., inevitable forces beyond 
human control.  
Poverty and oppression are view-
ed as an unavoidable fate and a nor-
mal condition, rather than as the pro-
duct of human action and abnormal. 
Because they take the facts of their 
socio-cultural situation as a “given,” 
they cannot investigate the socio-eco-
nomic contradictions within society 
and problematize their daily life si-
tuations. They lack what Freire (1972: 
62) calls “structural perception.” Their 
obsession is to meet their elementary 
needs, and that is why they are so 
vulnerable to challenges beyond their 
biological sphere. This form of con-
sciousness is characterized by fear of 
change, resignation, accommodation 
and conformity. Freire (1973:44) says: 
“Magic consciousness is characterized 
by fatalism, which leads men to fold 
their arms, resigned to the impossibi-
lity of resisting the power of facts.”  
Freire gives his theory of magic 
consciousness a Marxist content. It is 
thus typical of those who are domi-
nated, dependent, and oppressed, of 
those who live in closed societies with 
a “culture of silence.”In these circum-
stances, the oppressed see suffering 
not as the fruit of exploitation, but as 
the will of God. This lack of historical 
consciousness combined with a fata-
listic viewpoint is no doubt led to cul-
tural submersion and marginality. 
The second mode of conscious-
ness is naïve or semi-transitive. It is 
called transitive because persons at 
this level begin to become subjects 
who can dialogue with others, but it is 
only partly so because they do not yet 
know reality in a true act of knowing. 
This type of consciousness is still 
“quasi-immersed.” It is a process of 
emergence from silence by proposing 
and interrogating life situations. 
People at this level begin to under-
stand their socio-historical problems 
and contradictions, but they tend to 
oversimplify them and not investigate 
them thoroughly. They just need 
simple explanations. This state is open 
to manipulation by the power elites 
who use propaganda, slogans, or 
myths to maintain their oppression. 
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Nevertheless, this type of naïve 
consciousness in transitional societies 
contributes to paving the way for the 
masses to become conscious beings 
who are able to analyze more pre-
cisely what constitutes their society.  
The highest level of consciousness 
is critical consciousness, in which 
people can think as subjects. It is only 
in this state that true knowing can 
possibly come into existence. People 
at this level are able to perceive cri-
tically their existential reality via cau-
sal relationship analysis, to avoid sim-
ple comprehension of reality and text, 
and to understand the ‘deep struc-
ture’ of reality which people decode, 
problematize and transform. They al-
so have more self-confidence and 
openness to other ideas. People at this 
stage have moved from being pessi-
mistic, fatalistic, passive and apathetic 
to being optimistic and active. 
Freire argues that critical cons-
ciousness is brought about via cons-
cientization. In his language, “cons-
cientization represents the develop-
ment of the awakening of critical 
awareness” (Freire, 1976:19), wherein 
the agent must be a subject or a cons-
cious being, not simply one who prise 
de conscience. It also implies “the cri-
tical insertion of the conscientized 
person into a demythologized reality” 
(Freire, 1972:75). Thus, in conscienti-
zation, political engagement is im-
perative, because it embraces a critical 
demystification of an oppressive rea-
lity. Conscientization cannot come 
into existence without denouncing de-
humanizing reality and unjust struc-
tures and subsequently announcing 
and proclaiming a non-oppressive 
reality. “There is no annunciation wi-
thout denunciation, just as every de-
nunciation generates annunciation” 
(Freire, 1972:41). The human condit-
ion is perceived as socially construct-
ed and politically intervened and, 
therefore, people have to engage in 
making history. If human beings can 
produce social reality, why then can 
they not change it? 
However, it is important to note 
that critical consciousness cannot be 
‘imposed’ or ‘deposited’, but must be 
born through the creative efforts of 
the people. It also cannot be generated 
by intellectual effort alone, but needs 
praxis—the authentic unity of action 
and reflection. 
Freire’s theory of consciousness 
has not been without its critics, al-
though such critics do not provide 
sufficient reason to dismiss it for ana-
lytic purpose. One can argue that 
Freire tends to simplify the relation 
between one’s consciousness and 
social participation. Is it true that a 
person who possesses critical cons-
ciousness will automatically partici-
pate in societal change? I for one do 
not think so. Although critical cons-
ciousness is a significant factor in de-
termining a person’s social partici-
pation, it is not the only one. There 
are other determinant factors that 
contribute to his/her decision whether 
to engage in social participation or 
not, such as the politics of the regime, 
cultural considerations, the influence 
of mass media, to name a few.   
In defending Freire, Peter Mayo 
argues that such criticism is out of 
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date and results from a failure to 
analyze his works holistically. He 
points out that Freire’s later writings 
show “the need for teachers to work 
in wider contexts outside the school 
or educational settings and the oppor-
tunities provided by social move-
ments” (2004:26). Thus, Mayo argues 
that Freire’s pedagogy does not gua-
rantee that conscientized people will 
engage in action for social transfor-
mation.  
However, such a defensive argu-
ment requires critical consideration as 
Freire himself admitted his simplistic 
analysis of the issue: 
My mistake was not that I recog-
nized the fundamental importance of 
a knowledge of reality in the process 
of its change, but rather that I did not 
take these two different moments—
the knowledge of reality and the work 
of transforming that reality—in their 
dialectical relationship. It was as if I 
were saying that to discover reality 
already meant to transform it (Freire, 
1975:15, quoted in Diana Coben, 1998: 
75).  
Another debate focused on whe-
ther Freire’s proposal of the types of 
consciousness justifies the hierarchical 
modes of consciousness or not. Peter 
Roberts (2000) presents a fine evaluat-
ion of the complex issue of conscien-
tization, particularly in response to 
the critique of Peter Berger. Berger 
(1974) contends that Freire’s cons-
cientization, as a process of “cons-
ciousness raising,” is essentially an act 
of conversion in which certain people 
impose their cultural beliefs and 
truths on others in the name of 
assistance. Freire’s proposal seems to 
justify the hierarchical modes of cons-
ciousness in which one may come to 
be regarded as higher and more use-
ful than others. For Berger (1974:117), 
“the peasant knows his world far 
better than any outsider ever can.” 
Each group of people has its own un-
derstanding of the world and makes 
sense of it differently. It is for this 
reason that any attempt to raise some-
one’s consciousness is impossible, 
because no one can say that he/she is 
more conscious than the other. Thus, 
peasants cannot be regarded as less 
fully human than those who initiate 
literacy programs, for instance.   
In a response to the above cri-
tique, Roberts (2000) argues that 
Freire’s notion of types of conscious-
ness should be located in specific si-
tuations, namely, the conditions of 
people in urban and rural areas of 
Brazil during and before the early 
1960s. Although some features of 
these modes of consciousness may 
still persist in today’s society, “Freire 
never intended the categories to be 
taken as descriptors of ahistorical, 
universal stages for all individuals in 
every society to pass through” 
(Roberts, 2000:144). Roberts suggests 
that Freire’s archeology of conscious-
ness would be more accurately de-
fined as identifying different ways of 
making sense of the world instead of 
locating people at a lower level of 
consciousness than others. He says 
that: 
“He [Freire] is careful not to denigrate 
the people with whom he was work-
ing by declaring them lower beings. 
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His point in identifying magical and 
naïve consciousness is that these 
forms of thought are shaped by, and, 
serve the interests of, oppressor class. 
If there is any group at risk of being 
“denigrated” by Freire, it is those who 
deliberately promote a view of the 
world that reproduces an oppressive 
social order (Roberts, 2000:145). 
 
To strengthen his argument, 
Roberts presents Kevin Harris’s 
(1979:174) strong defense of Freire. 
Harris argues that consciousness-rais-
ing is necessary and desirable in si-
tuations where people do not under-
stand their existential reality. In con-
trast to Berger, for Harris, any indi-
vidual can achieve the stage of critical 
consciousness, regardless of their so-
cial status, either empowered/educat-
ed or exploited/deprived. Conscious-
ness-raising does not mean imposing 
one’s view on another; rather, it con-
sists in encouraging people to exa-
mine their world critically. 
I agree with Harris’s position. I 
suspect that Berger’s criticism is 
driven by a view of the neutrality of 
literacy or pedagogical practice. This 
position may lead someone to judge 
educational intervention as equal to 
imposition. I would like to argue that, 
although we must respect multi-cul-
tural perspectives and beliefs, this 
does not necessarily mean that edu-
cational practice should be neutral 
and without any value. Freire’s po-
sition is clear: “the neutrality of edu-
cation is one of the fundamental con-
notations of the naïve vision of edu-
cation” (1987:41). Pedagogy is never 
neutral because it is an act of politics 
and intervention, but this does not 
mean that it is an imposition, because  
the way it is delivered is through dia-
logue, not coercion. Furthermore, 
Freire argues that critical conscious-
ness cannot be ‘imposed’ or ‘deposit-
ed’, but must be born through the 
creative effort of individuals.  
 
Politics of Education 
Antonio Gramsci views politics as 
educative, in the sense that he gives 
his political activities educational 
content (Diana Coben, 1998). Politics 
is not merely regarded as the art of 
gaining power: it has an educational 
value. This position has situated 
Gramsci as one of the sources of adult 
education. Likewise, Ernesto “Che” 
Guevara gave his revolutionary action 
educational content. He once said: “If 
you want an education, join the re-
volution” (quoted in Jim Walker, 1981: 
120). Freire starts from a different 
point of departure compared to these 
figures. Instead of giving politics or 
revolution educational content, he 
gives education political content. For 
him, educators should be aware of the 
political nature of their practice. “It is 
not enough to say that education is a 
political act, just as it is not enough to 
say that political acts are also edu-
cative. It is necessary to truly assume 
the political nature of education” 
(Freire, 1998:46).  
Why does Freire give education 
political content? This is because his 
educational philosophy is based on 
praxis philosophy, an authentic and 
dialectical relation between reflection 
and action. At this point, Freire adds 
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new meaning to Marx’s famous 
eleventh thesis on Feuerbach: “The 
philosophers have only interpreted 
the world in various ways; the point, 
however, is to change it” (Cornell 
West, 1993:xiii).  
Pedagogy of the Oppressed is full of 
political nuance, manifested in the 
vocabulary of oppression, dehumani-
zation, objecthood, culture of silence, 
liberation, emancipation, conscienti-
zation, subjecthood, humanization, 
etc. These terms are a clear indication 
of Freire’s belief in the power and 
potency of education to bring about 
social change through human agency. 
The ideal construction of education is 
one that is ethical and utopian, one 
that can enlarge the democratic public 
sphere and produce a just social struc-
ture in which humanity is protected 
and the human condition improved.  
Freire proposes education as a 
“language of critique” (Giroux, 1992: 
18) by relating education to power 
and politics because these three do-
mains are intertwined. Education ar-
guably cannot be separated from the 
wider social context in which it exists, 
for it is constituted by a multiplicity of 
dimensions in a given social format-
ion. Instead of adapting to socio-poli-
tical formation, education has taken 
on the role of producing and creating 
public life. The real question actually 
is not whether education can create 
public life, but “What kind of public 
does it create?” (Neil Postman, 1995: 
18).  
However, Freire’s politics of libe-
ration is not merely based on a 
“language of critique” but also a 
“language of hope.” Hope is neither 
static nor solely emotional, but a mo-
tor force and an “ontological need”” 
(Freire, 1994:8), which is imperative in 
liberatory education. 
Freire’s notion of shifting the fo-
cus of learning from teacher to stu-
dent unquestionably alters the power 
relationship, not only in the classroom 
but in the social sphere as well. His 
statement that “education is politics” 
(Freire, 1987:46) means that all edu-
cational activities are political in na-
ture and have political qualities and 
consequences. The ways the teacher 
teaches, the knowledge preference 
that will be delivered, and the mode 
of relation that will be built, are all 
political, because they all contribute 
to either liberating or domesticating 
the student.  
Teachers should be consistent 
with their political choice and values. 
It is absurd for teachers to proclaim 
and teach democracy and justice while 
at the same time repressing individual 
voices in the class. It is hard to accept 
a teacher who advocates democracy, 
equality, and egalitarian principles 
while maintaining an authoritarian 
relationship with his/her pupils. Con-
sistency between speaking and acting 
is important to be maintained within 
the educator. 
Education as a political act also 
means that learning in the classroom 
is not merely a matter of knowledge 
acquisition and transmission; rather, 
it is a process of developing critical 
subjectivities in which the existing 
knowledge and power are conti-
nuously questioned.  What is insisted 
10 
 
Cakrawala Pendidikan, Februari 2011, Th. XXX, No. 1 
upon in the process of learning is, 
thus, not how to have and accumulate 
knowledge, but how to understand, 
critique, produce and use knowledge 
as a means of transforming reality 
(Almann, 1999:17). Only in this pers-
pective does the process of learning 
produce political implications. 
Freire argues that not only is 
methodology important to the process 
of learning, but so is the content, 
because it plays a significant role in 
the formation of subjectivities, i.e., the 
way students understand the world. 
At this point, it is important to look at 
how Henry A. Giroux (1983:176-204) 
and Peter McLaren (1998:174-175) 
develop what is called “emancipatory 
knowledge,” a notion that is inspired 
by Jurgen Habermas but which has a 
strong connection with Freire’s 
thought.  
Following Habermas, they divide 
knowledge into three types: technical, 
practical and emancipatory. The cha-
racteristics of technical knowledge are 
control, certainty, objectivity and 
value-free. The implication for edu-
cational theory is that it should ope-
rate in the interests of a lawlike mode 
of thought and separate knowledge 
from its process of constitution. A 
process of learning based on technical 
knowledge leads to a dialectical con-
tradiction between teachers who serve 
as transmitters of knowledge and stu-
dents who turn out to be passive con-
sumers, a position that makes it pos-
sible for the former to sort, regulate, 
and control the latter. 
The second type is practical know-
ledge, which provides the hermeneu-
tical tool of analysis necessary to 
interpret the nature of reality. It helps  
students to analyze the categories and 
assumptions that constitute reality 
and how they contribute to one’s un-
derstanding of the world. The cons-
titution of reality is mediated by 
language whereby human beings 
constantly produce and reproduce 
meanings through their interpretation  
of the world. The implication of this 
model for education is that know-
ledge is not delivered via imposition 
but rather is mediated through mu-
tual dialogue among learners. Stu-
dents are encouraged to explore and 
articulate their own values and to un-
derstand and evaluate them in terms 
of everyday life experiences. How-
ever, it inevitably fails to develop the 
type of analysis that can enable stu-
dents to identify the relationship bet-
ween knowledge and power, parti-
cularly how the dominant power and 
ideology produce a set of meanings, 
understandings and practices that 
support and sustain their structural 
domination, while at the same time 
preventing the emergence of a critical 
community. 
The final type is emancipatory 
knowledge, which orients students to 
comprehend social reality based on 
dialectical relations of power, arguing 
that reality is constituted by compet-
ing paradigms, each of which brings 
its own agenda, interest, value and 
ideology. The learning process, there-
fore, aims to critique knowledge and 
demystify the ideological interests be-
hind the construction of social reality, 
and then take action to create a form 
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of reality that is based on democratic 
and just principles. At this point, 
emancipatory knowledge attempts to 
transcend the mechanistic view of tech-
nical knowledge and to move beyond 
the category of understanding (insisted 
upon by practical interests) in order to 
arrive at transformation. Emancipatory 
knowledge encourages and strives for 
self-reflection. Presenting emancipa-
tory knowledge in the classroom has 
the effect of transforming students 
into subjects—independent and libe-
rated beings who have found their 
voices. 
Emancipatory knowledge is cons-
tituted on the basis of critique and 
action, meaning that it always engage-
es, as part of the historical process, in 
critiquing social reality and taking 
action to improve it. The basis for 
judging knowledge then is not whe-
ther it is “right” or “wrong,” but 
whether it is liberative or oppressive. 
If so, the process of learning that 
serves to disseminate this mode of 
thinking should be designed so as to 
promote the critical awareness and 
personal freedom necessary for the 
individual’s self-formation. This is the 
type of knowledge that can truly 
empower students.   
 
LIMITATIONS   OF   FREIRE’S 
THOUGHT    
Freire’s thought should not be 
accepted blindly or without critique. 
Freire himself urges his readers not to 
accept any ideas coming from another 
part of the world at face value, since 
these are always socially constructed 
and historically situated through the 
medium of language. His advice is to 
re-examine their suitability before  
transplanting them into another social 
context to avoid the imposition of one 
culture over another. There are some 
critics that can be addressed to 
Freire’s educational thought. 
 
Critique # 1: Two Simplistic Catego-
ries 
Freire has over polarized view of 
reality, which for him is always divid-
ed into two categories, such as bank-
ing versus liberatory pedagogy, op-
pressor-oppressed, dominator-domi-
nated, subject-object, and domestic-
cator-domesticated. This extreme po-
larization is a clear indication that he 
prefers one side and rejects the other. 
His magnum opus is, unsurprisingly, 
entitled Pedagogy of the Oppressed. 
Freire makes a clear choice in taking 
the side of the underclass.  
Criticism of this approach is fre-
quently offered, particularly deals 
with the tendency to see the world in 
terms of black-white or right-wrong 
categories, when in fact reality is far 
too complex to reduce it to such ca-
tegories alone. Presenting positions in 
diametrical or polar opposition contri-
butes to the production of simplistic 
analysis, because the world is actually 
not as simple as this. This way of 
thinking disregards the possibility 
that the same person in different si-
tuations can be the subject or the op-
pressor, and in others the object or the 
oppressed.     
Freire’s tendency to see society in 
terms of two extreme perspectives has 
also been criticized for lack of con-
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sistency. He seems to believe that the 
world of oppression cannot be seen 
except from the structural perspec-
tive. The problem with this view is 
that: What if a people’s story does not 
correspond to the theory of oppress-
sion? What if a people’s suffering is 
not caused by structural oppression? 
It can be argued that structural op-
pression is only one of many sources 
of the suffering of people, but not the 
only one. There are other sources, 
such as natural disasters, ethnic and 
religious conflict, illness, corrupt bu-
reaucracy, poverty, sexual violence, 
and the global market. Not all of these 
are caused by domination and op-
pression. Therefore, it is questionable 
whether his method can be applied to 
a group of learners whose main pro-
blem is not structural oppression, but 
something else. To be consistent with 
his theory that the existential reality 
of students should serve as the entry 
point of the learning process, Freire’s 
model cannot possibly be applied in 
every situation.    
From the above perspective, the 
oppressor-oppressed way of thinking 
is not always accurate for interpreting 
the meaning of social life. Since di-
viding the world into two categories 
is inadequate for an understanding of 
the complexities of life, it is necessary 
to extend the categories to include the 
concepts of class struggle, patriarchy 
and feminism, or difability, to name 
only a few. These categories can help 
people question and criticize a part of 
their existential reality, but not the 
whole of it because there is no single 
approach that can explain the whole 
phenomenon.   
 
Critique # 2: Simplistic Analysis 
Freire argues that there is an in-
timate relation between knowing and 
action, in the sense that our under-
standing of reality leads to action. He 
says, “It so happens every under-
standing, sooner or later an action 
corresponds. Once man perceives a 
challenge, understands it, and recog-
nizes the possibilities of response, he 
acts” (Freire, 1973:44). At this point, 
Freire views an automatic relation 
between critical understanding, cri-
tical consciousness, and critical action. 
But is this really the case? 
Freire’s view that knowing auto-
matically leads to action is subject to 
criticism.  Assuming that critical cons-
ciousness is always connected signi-
ficantly to social action is a facile ana-
lysis, because the case is not as simple 
as this since each element has its own 
dynamic: they are not always inter-
connected. There must be a kind of 
connecting factor between critical 
consciousness and cultural action wi-
thout which the former finds it dif-
ficult to produce the latter.  
This kind of criticism is denied by 
Peter Mayo (2004:60), arguing that 
“Freire’s pedagogy does not guaran-
tee that people will engage in action 
for social transformation once they 
become conscientized and begin to 
critically read the world.”However, 
Mayo’s defense is weak to justify be-
cause Freire himself admitted his fai-
lure to not differentiate between two 
moments, i.e., a moment of perceiving 
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reality critically and moment of trans-
forming that reality. This failure 
brings about the conclusion that “to 
discover reality meant to transform it” 
(Freire, 1975:15, as quoted in Diana 
Coben, 1998:75). 
 
Critique # 3: Inconsistency between 
Theory and Practice 
Freire elsewhere mentions the 
importance of dialogue to the learning 
process because it is the fulfillment of 
one’s ontological vocation. What is 
dialogue? Freire (1971:76) explains 
that “dialogue is the encounter bet-
ween men, mediated by the world, in 
order to name the world.” He also 
says that, “Only dialogue, which re-
quires critical thinking, is also capable 
of generating critical thinking. Wi-
thout dialogue, there is no communi-
cation, and without communication 
there can be no true education” (1971: 
81). Thus, it is impossible to have de-
mocratic learning in the absence of 
dialogue. Through dialogue, the di-
chotomy between the teacher, who is 
supposed to know everything, and 
the student, who is supposed to know 
nothing, no longer exists: both be-
come learners who teach and are 
taught. As a result, “arguments based 
on ‘authority’ are no longer valid” 
(Freire, 1971:67). 
This notion does not necessarily 
reduce the function of teachers to that 
of mere ‘facilitators,’ a position that 
Freire explicitly repudiated because 
he saw their task as one of contribut-
ing, together with students, to the pro-
duction of knowledge. Freire pointed 
out that “Teachers maintain a certain 
level of authority through the depth 
and breadth of knowledge of the sub-
ject matter that they teach” (Freire, 
1987, quoted in Allman, 1998:12).  How-
ever, he also insisted that the meaning 
of authority is not equivalent to 
authoritarianism, because the latter 
intrinsically contradicts the spirit of 
democracy that lies at the heart of 
Freire’s struggle.  
The insistence on dialogue in the 
learning process aims at avoiding  
narrative teaching, which in turn de-
pends on subject-object relationship. 
The content of learning in narrative 
teaching is lifeless, because it is de-
livered in the form of one-way com-
munication. As a result, there is no 
knowledge production, because know-
ledge is regarded as a static entity, “a 
corps of information—a dead body of 
knowledge—not a living connection 
to their reality” (Ira Shor and Paulo 
Freire, 1987:4). Teaching then is con-
sidered as technical matter per se: it is 
not intended to raise consciousness 
within learners. Narrative teaching is 
typical of banking education. 
However, in his later book, A 
Pedagogy for Liberation, Freire (1987:40) 
clarifies that “by criticizing banking 
education we have to recognize that 
not all kinds of lecturing is banking 
education.” He argues that lecturing 
can be used as oral codification that 
will later on be decoded by students 
and teacher. 
At this point, Mansour Fakih 
(2003) accuses Freire of being incon-
sistent with regard to dialogical me-
thod and knowledge production in 
the learning process. In other words, 
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he proposes and insists on a certain 
methodology, but does not follow 
through in practice. When Fakih met 
Freire in 1989 and took a class with 
him, he formed a very different im-
pression. His teaching method was 
hardly as provocative or powerful as 
he had expected: it was just common 
adult education. Rather than encoun-
tering the Freirean technique in class, 
he met with an anti-Freirean ap-
proach, because Freire himself em-
ployed lecture and narration in the 
learning process. As a result, he do-
minated the class, contradicting what 
he had said in his Pedagogy of the 
Oppressed, where he insists on dia-
logue. At this point, there was no 
gnosiological cycle, i.e., the dialectical 
relation between the moment of 
producing new knowledge and the 
moment of knowing the new know-
ledge, as insisted on by Freire. By 
relying on lecturing as his method of 
teaching, Freire had reduced the 
importance of dialogue. Content and 
method are equally important in the 
learning process, because no matter 
how good the content, when it is deli-
vered in a non-dialogical way it can 
be metamorphosed into dogma.  
Thus, Fakih had different impres-
sion after meeting Freire. Before, 
Fakih felt that his ideas were truly 
provocative, revolutionary and po-
werful. He experienced a great desire 
to develop Freire’s ideas in practice, 
seeing in them the seeds of leftist 
struggle. However, this impression 
suddenly disappeared when he found 
that Freire’s teaching method betray-
ed his own principle by using mono-
logue as a way of communication.  
 
CONCLUSION  
Paulo Freire is one of the most 
influential thinkers of education in the 
twentieth century. His ideas have 
been implemented in various places 
and contexts. Freire’s philosophy of 
education can be divided into three 
parts: philosophy of human beings, 
the archeology of consciousness, and 
education is politics. Freire’s philo-
sophy of human beings can be des-
cribed as Christian-Marxist human-
ism. He demonstrates his profound 
love for humanity while his pedago-
gical theory is based on fundamental 
trust and faith in people. Freire di-
vides three types of people’s cons-
ciousness: magical, naïve, and critical 
consciousness. Process of learning is 
oriented to develop people’s capacity 
to see the world in critical way so that 
they will be able to live in and with the 
world. In terms of the relation bet-
ween education and politics, Freire 
argues that education is not value-
free, but it is political. He gives edu-
cation political content. For him, edu-
cators should be aware of the political 
nature of their practice. The reason 
why Freire emphasizes on politics of 
education is because his educational 
philosophy is based on praxis philo-
sophy, an authentic and dialectical 
relation between reflection and action. 
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